Confronting a Christian Neighbor: Sudanese Representations of Ethiopia in the Early Mahdist Period, 1885-89 by Seri-Hersch, Iris
Int. J. Middle East Stud. 41 (2009), 247–267. Printed in the United States of America
doi:10.1017/S0020743809090655
Iris Seri-Hersch
CONFRONTING A CHRISTIAN NEIGHBOR :
SUDANESE REPRESENTATIONS OF ETHIOPIA
IN THE EARLY MAHDIST PERIOD , 1885–89
Al-Zaki ordered [his men] to bring it [Yohannes’s corpse] out of the box, and it was brought out.
He ordered [them] to cut his head off and hang it on a spear. So they cut his head off and hung
it on a spear. The ans
.
a¯r were delighted and rejoiced at this victory, which would stand as an
embroidery on the Muslim armies’ flags for centuries to come.1
This is how Isma–il bin –Abd al-Qadir, a Mahdist chronicler of late 19th-century Sudan,
gave a broad Islamic significance to the defeat of Ethiopian armies by Mahdist forces
at al-Qallabat in March 1889. Culminating in the death of Emperor Yohannes IV, the
four-year confrontation between Mahdist Sudan and Christian Ethiopia (1885–89) had
repercussions that transcended the local setting, reaching far into the intertwined history
of Sudan, Ethiopia, and European imperialism in the Nile Valley and Red Sea regions.
On the historiographical scene, Sudanese–Ethiopian relations in the early Mahdist
period have drawn little attention. Scarce studies have produced political and military
histories.2 I suggest examining Mahdist conceptions and attitudes toward Christian
Ethiopia through an approach that highlights representations. Two distinct meanings
of the term are particularly relevant for our study: representations as an object and
representations as a tool of history.3 This article addresses the following key issues:
How did a Mahdist scholar represent Sudanese–Ethiopian relations and to what ends?
Were his conceptions shared by the Sudanese ruling elite? How far do they reflect actual
practice in interacting with Christian Ethiopia?
Applying these questions to the years 1885–89, I focus on the border zone spreading
from the Atbara River to the Blue Nile. This area appears as a major theater of Mahdist–
Ethiopian collision in most primary and secondary sources.4 In addition to –Abd al-
Qadir’s writings, I have consulted Sudanese archives at the National Records Office
in Khartoum and accounts of foreigners who traveled or lived in Sudan and Ethiopia
during the Mahdist period,5 as well as scholarly works by historians, notably, those of
Sudanists Muhammad Ibrahim Abu Salim6 and Muhammad Sa–id al-Qaddal.
F R O M R E V O L U T IO N A RY M IL L E N A R IA N IS M T O S TAT E B U IL D IN G
In Sudan, the revolution led by the Mahdist movement between 1881 and 1885 ended
sixty years of Turco-Egyptian rule. Its leader—Muhammad Ahmad bin –Abdallah, who
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claimed to be al-mahdı¯ al-muntaz
.
ar7—quickly achieved political and military victo-
ries against the established regime thanks to wide support from various groups within
Sudanese society. The Turco-Egyptian government was resented by many because of
its foreign nature, its reliance on Christian officials such as Samuel Baker and Charles
Gordon, its oppressive fiscal policies, its attempts to suppress the slave trade, and its
efforts to impose Azharite orthodoxy in Sudan.8
The years 1881–85 can be seen as the formative period of the Mahdist state: the revolu-
tionary movement expanded its control over vast territories while being transformed into
a state apparatus. Khartoum’s conquest in January 1885 made the Mahdist capital move
from a rather peripheral zone (Jabal Qadir) to the very power center of Turco-Egyptian
rule. In addition to the Mahdiyya’s growing institutionalization, which was salient in the
administrative, military, financial, and judicial fields, all decision-making powers were
concentrated in the hands of the Mahdi. Indeed, the latter abolished the existing Sufi
orders and the Islamic traditional schools of law (madha¯hib), recognizing the sunna, the
Qur»an, and ilha¯m (prophetical inspiration) as the only sources for Mahdist law.9
Muhammad Ahmad’s death in June 1885 caused a momentary crisis in his community,
which was resolved by the designation of –Abdullahi al-Ta–aishi as his successor. During
the first part of his rule (1885–89), Khalifa –Abdullahi10 had to face various internal
and external challenges that had a significant impact on later evolutions in Mahdist
Sudan. Among numerous opposition forces, the ashra¯f (relatives and supporters of
the Mahdi) led by Muhammad Sharif represented the greatest threat to the khalifa’s
rule. Other insurrection movements erupted in Darfur and on the Sudanese–Ethiopian
border, the discourse of which often had messianic overtones. Besides these political
menaces, a destructive famine ravaged the Sudan in 1889–90, which had dramatic social,
demographic, and economic effects.11
In the external arena, the Mahdist state maintained tense relations with two of its
immediate neighbors: Egypt and Ethiopia. The former constituted the primary target
of Mahdist territorial expansion. Although the Mahdi had already planned to attack his
northern enemy, the campaign was postponed until 1889 on the grounds of physical
and political difficulties.12 The Sudanese forces were totally overwhelmed by Anglo-
Egyptian troops at the famous battle of Tushki (3 August 1889), which put an end to
Mahdist ambitions toward Egypt.
C O N S O L ID AT IN G A N IM P E R IA L O R D E R
Whereas Khalifa –Abdullahi completed the transformation of the Mahdist movement
into a state structure, negusa¨ na¨ga¨st13 (king of kings) Yohannes IV (1872–89) pursued
the imperial unification of Ethiopia that had been initiated by his predecessor Tewodros
II (1855–68). Rather than uncompromising centralization, Yohannes IV opted for a
policy of “controlled regionalism,”14 which led to the submission of –Adal of Gojjam
(October 1874) and Menelik of Shoa (March 1878), two prominent local commanders.
The process of imperial unification had a significant religious dimension, which was
reflected in mass Christianization policies.
In May–June 1878, Yohannes IV convened a council at Boru Meda, where the Tewa-
hedo creed was proclaimed official doctrine while Christian heretical sects were harshly
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condemned.15 The imperial edict did not merely address Ethiopian Christians. Muslims,
pagans, Gallas, and Jews were called to convert lest they be banished.16 Two famous
Muslim leaders of the Wallo region adopted Christianity—Amade Liban (known as
Abba Wataw) and Muhammad –Ali. Whereas the former was baptized Hayla Maryam
and obtained the title of dajjazmach, the latter became ras Mika»el and was given control
over a large part of the Wallo central highlands.17 Adhering to the official religion was
indeed a necessary condition for advancement within the Ethiopian political and military
hierarchy.
Yohannes IV’s Christianization policy included building numerous churches in Wallo,
excluding Muslims from the city of Aksum, and confiscating Islamic books.18 In quanti-
tative terms, 50,000 Muslims, 20,000 “pagans,” and half a million Gallas had supposedly
been baptized by 1880.19 The reactions of Wallo Muslims to the emperor’s evangelist
measures varied. Although most political leaders converted in order to keep their posts,
some secretly continued practicing Islam. Others migrated south or west toward Sudan.20
Military resistance was carried out on several occasions.21
In the external arena, Ethiopia’s unification was threatened by both European and
Egyptian protagonists. The opening of the Suez Canal (1869) attracted European pow-
ers to the Red Sea, and khedive Isma–il (1863–79) directed his expansionist efforts
toward Sudan and Ethiopia. He occupied the Bogos territory (also known as Senhit, see
Figure 1) in 1872 and the city of Harar three years later. Yohannes IV managed to crush
Turco-Egyptian ambitions by winning two decisive battles at Gundet and Gura (1875–
76).22 However, both France and Italy set foot on Ethiopia’s eastern coast, in Obock and
Assab, respectively, contemplating a future progression into the interior.
By the late 1870s, the emperor’s power had reached a climax: potential internal
rivals had been subdued, many of his Muslim subjects had been Christianized, and the
Egyptian adversary had been defeated. Yet the early 1880s witnessed strategic changes
that deeply affected Ethiopia. The Mahdist revolution and the simultaneous occupation
of Egypt by the British created a new set of dynamics, challenging Yohannes IV’s
political and personal survival. Weakened Egypt was replaced by a militant Mahdist
state as Ethiopia’s immediate neighbor. The increasing British presence in the Nile
Valley and the Red Sea eased Italian penetration into eastern Ethiopia.23 The year 1885
was a turning point in the emperor’s career: while Italy took control of the Massawa
port town with British tacit agreement (3 February 1885), an armed conflict broke out
between Sudan and Ethiopia. Regional commander Menelik’s growing insubordination
was a third factor weakening Yohannes IV’s uncertain political position.24
A C O N F R O N TAT IO N E N TA N G L E D IN E U R O P E A N IM P E R IA L
P R O C E S S E S
Political and military tensions between Sudan and Ethiopia were catalyzed by the
Hewett Treaty that Great Britain and Ethiopia signed on 3 June 1884. Yohannes IV
committed himself to assist the evacuation of Turco-Egyptian troops stationed on
his western border. In return, he regained the Bogos territory and was promised free
transit of all goods through Massawa, an easy dispatch of bishops from Alexandria,
and British arbitration in case of conflicts involving the khedive.25 Hence, Ethiopian
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FIGURE 1. The Sudanese–Ethiopian border zone in 1889. Adapted from Mahdiism and the Egyptian Sudan.26
[A color version of this figure can be viewed online at journals.cambridge.org/mes]
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soldiers found themselves fighting against Mahdist forces in Kassala and in an area
between the Atbara River and the Blue Nile. Three major Turco-Egyptian centers lo-
cated in that zone fell under Mahdist control in 1884–85: al-Qadarif, al-Qallabat, and
al-Jira.27
From March 1885, bidirectional raids across the Sudanese–Ethiopian border signifi-
cantly increased. Local Mahdist commander Muhammad wad Arbab was killed during
an Ethiopian assault on al-Qallabat in January 1887, which caused the death of thou-
sands of ans
.
a¯r.28 The next Mahdist governor of al-Qallabat, Yunis al-Dikaym, openly
provoked Ethiopia when he arrested a caravan of Ethiopian merchants, sending them
to Omdurman as if they were war captives. Intending to strengthen Mahdist positions
on the eastern front, Khalifa –Abdullahi ordered amir Hamdan Abu –Anja to quit the
Nuba Mountains and join al-Dikaym. Shortly after his arrival at al-Qallabat (early
December 1887), political and religious troubles engendered tensions between the two
commanders.29 Al-Dikaym was eventually recalled to Omdurman and replaced by Abu
–Anja.
During his one-year tenure, Abu –Anja organized two great campaigns into Ethiopian
territory. The first was directed against Takla-Haymanot,30 whose troops were defeated
in Dambiya in January 1888. After sacking the ancient imperial capital of Gondar, the
Sudanese forces quickly returned to al-Qallabat. Although this expedition constitutes
the furthest Mahdist territorial expansion into Ethiopia, it was not pursued because of
geographic, logistic, strategic, and religious factors.31 The second was when Abu –Anja
led his troops to the Balesa province, east of Lake Tana in June 1888. Heavy rains
nevertheless constrained the ans
.
a¯r, who retreated after a short while.
The amir’s sudden death in January 1889 provoked a temporary confusion about
his succession. A Mandala client of the Ta–aishi tribe, al-Zaki Tamal, was eventually
appointed. Meanwhile, Yohannes IV prepared his armies to crush the Mahdist camp. He
launched an attack on al-Qallabat on 9 March 1889, during which his troops managed
to penetrate the town. The ans
.
a¯r were on the verge of being overwhelmed when the
emperor was hit by a bullet and collapsed. Horrified, the Ethiopian soldiers took flight,
and victory turned into defeat.32 Considerable booty fell into Mahdist hands, including
many objects and clothes that had belonged to Yohannes IV.
The battle of al-Qallabat marked a peak in the conflict between Mahdist Sudan and
Ethiopia. During the 1890s, relations between the two states gradually improved until a
peace agreement was reached in 1897.33
In spite of its limited territorial scope, the 1885–89 confrontation bore some major
strategic implications on the regional level. First, Yohannes IV’s death meant the end
of Tigre as the political center of Ethiopia. Power shifted to Shoa as Menelik seized
the imperial throne and espoused a conciliatory policy toward Sudan.34 Second, Italian
imperialist ambitions progressed thanks to the absence of both the emperor and his
vassal Alula from Ethiopia’s eastern front. Promptly formalized through the Wichale
Treaty (2 May 1889), Italian expansion into northeastern Ethiopia led to the creation of
the colony of Eritrea (1 January 1890). Thus, Italy can be held as the regional actor that
most benefited from the Sudanese–Ethiopian conflict. Whereas Ethiopia experienced
serious territorial amputation, Mahdist Sudan found itself frontally challenged by the
Italian power.35
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T H E T IR A Z : A L IT E R A RY E M B R O ID E RY O F F E R E D T O K H A L IFA
–A B D U L L A H I
The Sudanese–Ethiopian conflict seems to have been of great importance to the khalifa,
who wanted an official version of the facts to be written and distributed among his
literate subjects. The work was left to Isma–il bin –Abd al-Qadir (1844–97), the author
of a book about the Mahdi’s life and the Mahdiyya’s early years.36 His chronicle was
completed less than three months after the battle of al-Qallabat under the title Al-Tiraz
al-Manqush bi-Bushra Qatl Yuhanna Malik al-Hubush (The Embroidery Inscribed with
the Good News of the Slaying of Yohannes, King of the Ethiopians).37 It was given wide
diffusion throughout Sudan.
Born in the provincial capital of El Obeid, –Abd al-Qadir studied at al-Azhar for twelve
years and was later appointed mufti of Kordofan under Turco-Egyptian rule. Although
the reasons why he joined the Mahdist movement in September 1882 remain uncertain,
it seems that he settled down in Omdurman after the fall of Khartoum (January 1885).38
–Abd al-Qadir attained a high position within the judicial and religious system of the
Mahdist state as a qadi and –alim enjoying a close relationship with the khalifa.
However, his career was abruptly interrupted by his banishment to al-Rajjaf (upper
White Nile) in August 1893, where he died a few years later.39 The khalifa ordered
the burning of all copies of his books, which included several scientific, historical, and
poetical writings.
How should we understand this decision, as the Tiraz praises –Abdullahi in multiple
ways? At a time when Menelik II tried to establish friendly relations with his western
neighbor, the head of the Mahdist state possibly sought to get rid of any writing associated
with anti-Ethiopian propaganda. In addition, the elimination of a chronicle that stressed
the role of men other than the khalifa contributed to consolidate the latter’s personal grip
on political power.40
In a historiographical perspective, the Tiraz constitutes a primary source of major
importance for the study of Sudanese–Ethiopian relations. It is chronologically the first
work depicting the 1885–89 conflict and counts among the very few narrative-oriented
sources that espouse a Mahdist viewpoint on Sudan. We know its existence thanks to
the ka¯tib Muhammad Ahmad Hashim, who secretly conserved one copy of the Tiraz
despite the khalifa’s order to destroy all of –Abd al-Qadir’s writings.41
Given that the chronicler did not personally witness most of the events he relates,
what were his sources? He relied on his book about the early Mahdiyya and on various
proclamations from the Mahdi and the khalifa, as well as on a small number of letters
exchanged between the khalifa and Mahdist commanders posted at al-Qallabat. However,
he privileged oral accounts of direct witnesses, such as the qadi al-Islam Ahmad –Ali.42
S U B O R D IN AT IN G H IS T O RY T O PA N E G Y R IC E N D S
Written in literary Arabic and comprising numerous stylistic devices, the Tiraz is struc-
tured according to the following scheme:
Preamble Motives, objectives, and contents of the Tiraz
Preface Legitimization and glorification of Khalifa –Abdullahi
1st chapter Yunis al-Dikaym’s command (Spring 1887–January 1888)
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2nd chapter Hamdan Abu –Anja’s command (December 1887–January 1889)
3rd chapter Al-Zaki Tamal’s command (February–March 1889)
Conclusion Mahdist operations in Darfur, Equatoria, Suakin; military plan to conquer Egypt
Throughout his book, –Abd al-Qadir emphasizes Mahdist military victories not only
against Ethiopia but also in Darfur, Equatoria, Egypt, and on the Red Sea coast. The
glorification and idealization of these successes aimed at consolidating the khalifa’s
political and religious legitimacy, which was largely questioned by the ashra¯f and
other opposition forces. The Tiraz depicts the Mahdi’s successor as a perfect model
of statesman, military commander, and pious figure. –Abd al-Qadir’s triumphal and
optimistic tone stems from the particular historical circumstances in which he wrote
the chronicle: after the Mahdist victories against Abu Jummayza43 in Darfur and the
Ethiopians at al-Qallabat (respectively, on 22 February and 9 March 1889) but before
the ans
.
a¯r’s total failure at Tushki (3 August 1889).
As a panegyric work, how is the Tiraz connected to historical reality? –Abd al-Qadir’s
objective is clearly stated in the preamble: to convince the world of the Mahdiyya’s
ultimate truth. This assumed ahistorical approach remains consistent throughout the
entire narrative. The author does not hesitate to alter certain aspects of historical reality
to achieve his panegyric and persuasive ends. Some facts and processes are deformed
and others are simply omitted. For instance, several expeditions into Ethiopian territory
are related in an incorrect chronological order, and some of their commanders are not
rightly named.44 Among some crucial events that are silenced, let us mention the episode
of al-Nabi –Isa,45 the quarrel it provoked between the amirs al-Dikaym and Abu –Anja,
the activities of the ashra¯f, Mahdist military defeats against Ethiopian forces (such as
the one in Kufit in September 1885), and the intensive epistolary exchanges between
various Sudanese and Ethiopian leaders.46
How are we to explain these multiple deformations and omissions? What can they
teach about –Abd al-Qadir’s political, ideological, and religious orientations? First,
specific deformations could result from unintentional human errors. Second, particularly
threatening facts are omitted in order not to undermine the khalifa’s position as the
Mahdi’s sole legitimate successor.47 Third, –Abd al-Qadir distorts or leaves out events
that could endanger the Mahdiyya’s image as a united and victorious movement. Finally,
his efforts to describe Sudanese–Ethiopian relations in an absolutely Manichean manner
discard any complexity or nuances.48 Hence, his position within the Mahdist state seems
to suit Abu Salim’s model: as a historian employed by the regime, he had to document
the events in a way that glorified the government and legitimated the existing system.49
Even though the Tiraz is not reliable from a classical historical stance, it becomes an
extremely useful source for the study of representations when confronted with various
historical documents.
T H E S U D A N E S E – E T H IO P IA N C O N F L IC T: A V IC T O RY O F IS L A M
O V E R C H R IS T IA N IT Y
The Tiraz narrates the Sudanese–Ethiopian confrontation from a Mahdist perspective,
which implies a sharp distinction between the ans
.
a¯r and the kuffa¯r (unbelievers includ-
ing non-Mahdist Muslims).50 Contrary to al-Qaddal’s assumption, the infidels were not
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perceived as a homogeneous group of “Turks”51 : the Ethiopians were actually singular-
ized among other unbelievers. –Abd al-Qadir names them kuffa¯r or –abadat al-s
.
alı¯b (cross
worshippers) in some cases, but he mostly uses the more specific and less religiously
connoted term of H
.
abasha.52
His book represents Sudanese–Ethiopian relations through three important stages.
The first one consists of justifying Mahdist warfare against Ethiopia from 1887 to 1889.
For this purpose, the author interprets a prophetical hadith in the light of events that
occurred in Sudan before the Mahdist revolution. The Prophet’s saying to the Muslims
“utruku¯ al-H
.
abasha ma¯ taraku¯kum” (leave the Ethiopians alone as long as they leave
you alone) was relevant in early Muslim history, a time when—according to –Abd
al-Qadir—Ethiopia was not a priority target of Islamic expansion. However, strategic
conditions had greatly changed by the late 19th century. Corrupted Turco-Egyptian
rulers let Ethiopian unbelievers invade the “land of Islam” (Sudan), build churches, and
collect taxes from its inhabitants.53 In addition, Christian ruler Yohannes IV refused to
submit to God and unjustly killed disciples of the Mahdi.54 Relying on these arguments,
–Abd al-Qadir claims the fight against the Ethiopians to be fully licit. It is not only a
right but a compulsory duty falling to the Muslim community as a whole.
The second stage pertains to the attitude that the Mahdist state actually endorsed
toward Ethiopia. A phase of verbal persuasion, materialized by two warning letters
addressed by the khalifa to the emperor in 1887, is followed by a process of physical
coercion. In –Abd al-Qadir’s perspective, warfare constitutes the main instrument of
Sudanese policy toward Ethiopia. As a holy war ( jihad), it implies the fusion of military
and religious aspects inherent to Mahdist ideology. Military actions and procedures, as
well as victories and defeats, constantly express the will of God. The image of a tight
and compact line of ans
.
a¯r is crucial in the Tiraz, for it is associated with both a military
and a spiritual posture.55
The book is dominated by a Manichean representation of the Sudanese–Ethiopian
conflict, which is attained through various literary and narrative processes. Hence, the
battle of al-Qallabat (March 1889) is depicted with the help of an elaborate metaphorical
and symbolic language. Whereas the rapid progression of the Ethiopians is successively
compared to a waterfall and a cloud of locusts, the Mahdists are evoked through their
superior moral qualities: they are firmly determined to fight and die for the cause
of Islam.56 The gap between victors and losers is mostly stressed after the cessation of
hostilities. Countless Ethiopian corpses strew the ground; the survivors cowardly pretend
that their king merely suffers from injuries, although a deadly bullet actually hit him.
By contrast, the fallen ans
.
a¯r are represented as a small group of martyrs (shuhada¯»)
honored by God. Whereas their blood looks like gold on their necks, Ethiopian blood
soils the Atbara River and pollutes its water.
–Abd al-Qadir stresses the conflict’s dramatic metaphysical implications by exploring
semantic fields of terms such as na¯r (fire) and z
.
ulma (darkness). As the Ethiopian troops
move toward al-Qallabat, they are identified with bad fate and hell:
They [the Ethiopians] started lighting fires to remove the grass and the trees so that they could get
through these abrupt places. I say: lighting fires masked a bad omen, which God realized in this
world by burning them with the fire coming from firearms shot by the ans
.
a¯r. The fire of beyond
is most intense! Accompanied by night fires lit to roast the food of the Ethiopian army, these fires
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could be seen from a three-day distance because of the intensity of their flames, which rose high
into the sky [my emphasis throughout].57
An immediate connection between the material and eschatological worlds appears as
fighting between the Mahdists and the Ethiopians intensifies. The combination of firearm
smoke, clouds of dust, and hand-to-hand fights between the two armies creates a partic-
ular type of apocalyptical darkness. –Abd al-Qadir also emphasizes the divine nature of
Mahdist struggle against Ethiopia by describing miracles that occurred during the battle
of al-Qallabat. Mentioning these wonders58 contributes to the depiction of the conflict
as a victory of Islam over Christianity.
The third stage relates to the outcome of Sudanese jihadist policy toward Ethiopia,
which perfectly fits into –Abd al-Qadir’s ideological reasoning: Yohannes IV dies on
the battlefield. Both the causes and the meaning of his death are interpreted in such
a way as to crystallize a double lesson in the reader’s mind: Mahdist victory against
Christian infidels is inevitable, for it expresses God’s will, but it is also the work of
Khalifa –Abdullahi. The chronicler explains the emperor’s death by his exaggerated
self-pride and hostile attitude toward Muslims. Its meaning is exceptional on several
grounds. It not only eliminated a great threat to Islam, but it also counts among the
most important conquests in Muslim history. According to –Abd al-Qadir, the death
of a Christian Ethiopian emperor at the hands of Muslim forces was hitherto unseen
in the history of interactions between Ethiopia and the Islamic world. Moreover, it
occurred—thanks to divine will—during Khalifa –Abdullahi’s reign.59 At the end of the
battle, the ans
.
a¯r deal with Yohannes IV’s corpse in a manner that strengthens the double
message. The objects and clothes covering the body symbolize the Christian religion
and the sybarite tendencies of the Ethiopian king: a golden cross, a matab (religious
neck ribbon),60 a gem-decorated crown, and embroidered garments. They are sent to
Omdurman as a material evidence of Yohannes IV’s scornful attitude toward God. As
the most central war trophy of the Sudanese-Ethiopian conflict, the emperor’s head is
cut off and brought to the khalifa with heads of other Ethiopian commanders. In this
way, the bloody message not only announces victory but also grants it to the head of the
Mahdist state.61
My analysis has shown that the Tiraz celebrates the victory of Mahdist Islam over
Christianity in the shape of a panegyric dedicated to Khalifa –Abdullahi. Sudanese policy
toward Ethiopia bears no ambiguity: as a Christian entity that has dared to attack the
frontiers of Islam, Ethiopia deserves to sustain the wrath of Mahdist jihad. However, was
this perspective widely shared among the Sudanese ruling elite? If this apparently rigid
logic framed their policies, what did it mean in practice and how was it legitimized?
T H E L IM IT S O F A U N IV E R S A L M IS S IO N
Depicted in various primary and secondary sources, Mahdist attitudes62 toward Ethiopia
were much less obvious and linear than in –Abd al-Qadir’s work. Their complexity
resides in the gap between theory and practice but more fundamentally in the definition
of Mahdist ideology on the Ethiopian issue. How did Sudanese leaders conceive of the
scope of the Mahdist mission? Should it be limited to the struggle against Turco-Egyptian
domination or be extended to other parts of the world?
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Both historians and contemporaries of the Mahdiyya agree that the ambitions of the
Mahdist revolution transcended the Sudanese arena. Whereas some scholars restrain its
scope to the Islamic world, others extend it to the whole of humanity.63 However, the
distinction between these two conceptions is not clear-cut. We should examine how the
Mahdist elites perceived the external world before formulating any hypothesis.
Two elements must then be stressed. First, the world lying outside Sudan was grasped
in theological rather than geographical terms. Anyone who did not accept Muhammad
Ahmad’s divine mission was considered an infidel. Second, the Mahdi’s horizon was
quite narrow, for it was limited to Muslim countries whose existence he was aware of.64
Like his predecessor, the khalifa sent letters to Muslim leaders in an attempt to convince
them to submit to the Mahdiyya, yet he also included non-Muslim states such as Ethiopia
and Britain.65 Expansionist efforts were abandoned after the defeat at Tushki and the
great famine that ravaged Sudan in 1889–90. Therefore, Mahdist ambitions significantly
evolved according to political, military, and economic circumstances. Without being the
main prey of the Sudanese appetite, Ethiopia counted among a number of regional actors
whose existence the doctrine of the Mahdiyya could not easily accommodate.
T H E A M B IG U IT Y O F T H E JIH A D C O N C E P T
The term “jihad” is frequently used to describe both the ideology and the foreign policy
of the Mahdist state. What does this concept mean in the particular historical context of
Sudanese–Ethiopian relations? Numerous scholars agree on the conditions that propelled
the use of jihad. Warfare followed the failure of persuasive efforts attempting to convert
an area or state to Mahdist Islam. However, what precisely were the ends of this jihad?
Although some historians see it as an instrument of forced conversions, others view it as
a means to punish the unbelievers or subjugate them through enslavement.66 Jihad was
also employed to fight against foreign rule (embodied by the Turco-Egyptian regime) or
prevent unbelievers from invading the land of Islam.67 Abu Shouk stresses an interesting
economic function. Under the banner of jihad, the Mahdist state often massacred people
considered as infidels (Muslims or not) and confiscated their property. This state booty
was then appropriated by the public treasury (bayt al-ma¯l).68 Whatever its objectives,
Mahdist jihad always conjured up a clash between the God led ans
.
a¯r—the only pos-
sessors of divine truth—and a mass of unbelievers. Therefore, jihad pertains to the
ideological representation of a struggle whose goals could vary. Warfare is made holy
by the ways in which it is legitimized rather than by its specific ends.
Addressing the Sudanese–Ethiopian military confrontation, should we see jihad as the
main cause of conflict or merely as a rhetorical instrument for its legitimization? A few
historians espouse a view similar to –Abd al-Qadir’s by identifying the jihadist orientation
of the Mahdist state as a central explanatory factor. Because Ethiopia belonged to da¯r
al-h
.
arb, it was automatically the target of Mahdist attack. The religious obstacle between
the two countries counted among the principal reasons underlying the conflict.69
Conversely, many scholars depart from the jihadist perspective by suggesting his-
torical, political, military, and economic motives. For some of them, the conflict has
historical roots that can be traced to the Funj Sultanate (1504–1821).70 This explanation
seems particularly relevant when taking into account the works of Merid Wolde Aregay,
Sergew Hable Selassie, and Mordechai Abir. They emphasize the persistence of certain
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sources of tension between the Sudanese and Ethiopian entities during the Funj and
Turco-Egyptian periods: border-drawing issues, slave raids, and political support of
rebels from each side.71 Political and military dynamics of clash included activities
of local landlords in the border zone, internal rivalries, the khalifa’s willingness to
keep his armies busy far from the capital, and the application of the Hewett Treaty,
as well as Egyptian and British efforts to foster Ethiopian hostility toward Sudan.72
Economic motives certainly greased the mechanism of conflict: opportunities to capture
human and material booty in cross-border raids were enhanced by the commercial and
strategic importance of al-Qallabat.73 Discussing the origins of the Sudanese–Ethiopian
confrontation allows us to relativize the role of jihad as the main catalyst of Mahdist
policy toward its neighbor. We should consider it a legitimizing device rather than as a
frozen, inflexible policy.
T H E H E R ITA G E O F E A R LY M U S L IM – A K S U M IT E C O N TA C T S
Although jihad served as a general framework for legitimizing Mahdist policies, other
instruments were more precisely adapted to the Ethiopian case. The Mahdist elites
used various prophetical references to make their attitudes acceptable to Sudanese or
even Ethiopian sensibilities. An important tool consisted of reactivating the ambivalent
heritage resulting from the first contacts between Muslims and the Kingdom of Aksum.
Facing a hostile environment, the emerging Muslim community found refuge at the
court of negus Adriaz in 615.74 The Quraysh leaders of Mecca hostile to Muhammad
sent a delegation to Aksum in order to ask the return of the refugees to Arabia. At




a¯ba, Ja–far bin Abu Talib (Muhammad’s cousin) successfully
presented Islam as a form of Christianity in order to convince the negus to continue
granting asylum to the Muslims.75 Whereas a minority of refugees joined the Prophet on
his hijra to Yathrib (subsequently renamed Medina), most of them remained in Aksum
until the Muslim conquest of Mecca (631).
This historical plinth fed two great traditions within Islamic thought. The first one
relies on a 9th-century hadith, according to which the Prophet had ordered his disciples:
“Let the Ethiopians alone as long as they leave you alone” (utruku¯ al-H
.
abasha ma¯
taraku¯kum).76 This saying is interpreted as a gesture of gratefulness for the assistance
Ethiopia granted to the Muslims at a critical moment of their history. During the Middle
Ages, a rich literature developed on the legal status of Ethiopia. Some Muslim jurists
nuanced the traditional distinction between da¯r al-Isla¯m and da¯r al-h
.
arb by defin-





conciliation).77 These statuses were attributed to territories enjoying a temporary agree-
ment with the abode of Islam. However, several areas were exempted from jihad without
any accord with Islam. Grouped under the name da¯r al-h
.
iya¯d (abode of neutrality),
such exceptional cases were justified by doctrinal or practical motives. They included
Ethiopia, Nubia, Cyprus, and the Turks’ land.78 In this regard, it is crucial to emphasize
that their position was not chosen but rather imposed by Islam:
. . . [U]nder [a] legal system which regards all countries as inherently hostile save those which
have obtained security by Islam’s consent, only those states which Islam agreed to spare from the
jihad might be regarded as neutral. Strictly speaking, such states were not neutral, in the sense of
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the modern law of nations, which recognizes the right of a state to declare [its] neutrality toward
two or more belligerent powers; these states were neutralized states, that is, their neutrality was
guaranteed by the powers, including the belligerent power or powers themselves [my emphasis].79
Could this tolerant tradition toward Ethiopia explain the fact that the Muslims re-
frained from invading it during the first two centuries of Islam, or is the famous hadith
a later fabrication meant to justify the incapacity of Islam to conquer Ethiopia? Most
historians support the second hypothesis. In early Islamic times, Arabs’ unsophisticated
navigation techniques thwarted invasion of Ethiopia from the sea. The country’s moun-
tains constituted a second natural barrier to potential invaders.80 Moreover, the relative
poverty of the Aksumite kingdom made it less attractive than the wealthy Byzantine and
Sassanid empires. Hence, the fact that Ethiopia remained untouched by Muslim forces
for centuries, combined with the prophetical hadith (utruku¯ al-H
.
abasha ma¯ taraku¯kum),
led Muslim thinkers to define a particular status for Ethiopia (da¯r al-h
.
iya¯d).
A second tradition developed out of Muslim–Aksumite contacts, which also shaped
the ways in which the Muslim world dealt with Ethiopia. It is rooted in a story reported
by al-Tabari, according to which the Prophet sent a letter to the Aksumite negus, calling
upon him to adopt Islam. Medieval Islamic sources state that al-Najashi put the letter on
his head, descended from his throne, and pronounced the shaha¯da as a sign of submission
to Islam. He then sent a message to the Prophet in order to confirm his conversion.81 He
even provided the Muslims of Medina with military support. When the negus died, “the
Prophet prayed for him and implored God to forgive his sins.”82 Contrary to this type
of Islamic literature, Western and Ethiopian modern historiographies deny al-Najashi’s
conversion to Islam.
Stressing Ethiopia’s submission, this Islamic tradition was later used to legitimize
intolerant attitudes toward the Christian kingdom. For example, in 16th-century Ethiopia,
where coastal areas had been gradually Islamized since the end of the 10th century,
a local Muslim leader initiated a militant campaign against the Christian Solomonic
Kingdom.83 Imam Ahmad bin Ibrahim (nicknamed Gran˜ in Amharic, which means “the
left-handed”) was motivated by a jihadist ideal to compel Ethiopia to enter da¯r al-Isla¯m.
Between 1527 and 1543, his Muslim armies occupied the highlands’ main cities, burnt
churches and monasteries, and converted a large number of Christians by force. Imam
Ahmad managed to extend his power to three quarters of the Ethiopian territory.84 His
attempt at Islamization ended when Emperor Galawdewos (1540–59) defeated him near
Lake Tana with Portuguese support.
Stressing the illegitimacy of Christian Ethiopia as a political and religious entity, imam
Ahmad’s jihad broke with the cautious attitude Muslims had traditionally espoused
toward the Christian kingdom.85 His militant project was closely connected to the
tradition that denigrated Ethiopia’s Christian identity through an emphasis on the negus’s
conversion to Islam.
M A H D IS T R E V IVA L O F A N A M B IVA L E N T L E G A C Y
How did the ruling elite of Mahdist Sudan reactivate the ambivalent legacy of early
Muslim–Aksumite interactions? I address this question by analyzing letters sent to
Emperor Yohannes IV by three central actors of the Mahdist state: the Mahdi, Khalifa
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–Abdullahi, and amir Hamdan Abu –Anja. Answering a letter in which the emperor
expresses his willingness to be informed of Sudanese intentions toward Ethiopia, the
Mahdi affirms the authority of Islam over all other religions and strives to convince
Yohannes IV to convert. He legitimizes his attitude on the basis of two principles. First,
he appropriates the militant tradition whose premise is the conversion of the Aksumite
negus to Islam. Second, he uses analogical reasoning, stating that because he is the
Prophet’s successor, Yohannes IV is al-Najashi’s successor and thus has to act like him.
The Mahdi offers no other alternative: “If you choose disobedience and prefer blindness
to guidance and the right path, it will be your fault and the fault of your followers, for
you will inevitably fall into our hands. We were promised the possession of the whole
earth, of which you represent only a small part.”86 In light of this clearly aggressive
stance, we do not agree with Erlich when he asserts that the Mahdi’s letter includes
“both contradictory messages of ancient times.”87
Drawing from the precedent established by the Mahdi, the khalifa’s attitude toward
Ethiopia significantly evolved according to strategic, political, and military circum-
stances. A few months after his accession to power, he reactivated the tolerant tradition
in order to restrain –Uthman Diqna’s ambitions in northern Ethiopia. He wrote to his
commander:
We heard the news of your advance to Ethiopia. . . . Things should be arranged according to their
importance and we have heard that the problems in Kassala are still unsettled . . . and so is the
situation in [Suakin] . . . Do not attach great importance to the Ethiopian affair. . . . Leave the
Ethiopians and do not enter their country now. . . . Return to [Suakin]; that is what we want.88
The utruku¯ al-H
.
abasha tradition is less a cause for the khalifa’s attitude than a legitimiz-
ing device. To the Mahdist leader, dealing with the Egyptians and the British seemed at
that moment more urgent than escalating the conflict with Ethiopia. In 1887, the khalifa
wrote two letters to Yohannes IV, whose comparison reflects a deep transformation of
his attitude toward his eastern neighbor. In less than a year, political pragmatism was
replaced by an uncompromising ideological religiosity.
The first letter was written after the Ethiopian attack on al-Qallabat (January 1887) and
contains two levels of proposal. At the political level, the emperor can avoid a Mahdist
attack by fulfilling three conditions set by the khalifa: returning Muslim war captives
to Sudan, clarifying the position of Muslim “traitors” who took refuge in Ethiopia,
and respecting the frontiers of the “land of Islam.”89 Satisfying such conditions would
preserve the status quo between Sudan and Ethiopia. The second proposal pertains to
the spiritual and ideological spheres. The khalifa calls upon Yohannes IV to convert
to Mahdist Islam but in a very different way than that of the Mahdi eight months
earlier. Rather than mentioning the Aksumite negus, he refers to a Qur»anic verse (3:64)
enjoining the “people of the book” (ahl al-kita¯b) to believe solely in Allah. If the emperor
refuses, “the transgression of the borders [would lead to] disastrous consequences.”90 A
Mahdist assault would result from an Ethiopian incursion beyond what was considered
the Christian kingdom’s border—but not from Yohannes IV’s rejection of Islam. Later
in his letter, the khalifa explicitly refers to the utruku¯ al-H
.
abasha hadith to justify the
“fact” that the ans
.
a¯r refrained from fighting against Ethiopia.91 His attitude is perhaps
purposefully ambivalent. On the one hand, he seems to espouse a militant approach
when he calls the emperor to convert to Mahdist Islam. On the other hand, he suggests
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the possibility of a political agreement whose legitimization is rooted in the famous
hadith.
The second letter he addressed to Yohannes IV does not show any sign of moderation
or readiness to compromise. This can be partially explained by the changing balance of
power between Sudan and Ethiopia. Toward the end of 1887, the khalifa was preoccupied
by Ethiopian moves in the border zone and opted for a more offensive stance. While Abu
–Anja was joining forces with al-Dikaym in al-Qallabat (December 1887), the khalifa
sent a hostile letter to his Ethiopian counterpart. It follows the logic previously espoused
by the Mahdi, founded on Christian Ethiopia’s illegitimacy. Mahdist raids (led by al-
Dikaym in May–June 1887) are justified by the fact that the emperor did not respond to
any of the Mahdi’s and khalifa’s injunctions. Unlike al-Najashi, the emperor refused to
enter da¯r al-Isla¯m. That is why “the Muslims attacked [his] land, destroyed the houses,
killed the men, burnt the churches and the big cities, outraged the women, and made
the children orphans. They came back with great booty and God’s satisfaction.”92 As an
ultimate warning, this letter still allows Yohannes IV to change his mind and convert.
However, if he persists in his disobedience, he should expect Ethiopia’s total devastation
at the hand of Mahdist forces.93 In contrast to the first letter, this one constantly evokes
divine will as the catalyst of human decisions and actions. Its religious militant rhetoric
does not allow room for political negotiations.
Such a militant attitude lasted until the emperor’s death (10 March 1889). Abu –Anja’s
reply to a peace proposal from the Ethiopian ruler (dated 25 December 1888) pushed
the khalifa’s logic to an extreme point. First, he introduces himself as “the commander
of the armies of Islam [whose purpose is] to annihilate the vile unbelievers.”94 Second,
he recalls the militant tradition that the Mahdi assumed before him, condemning the
emperor’s refusal to accept the Mahdist message. The inflexibility of his ideological
posture is most salient when he mocks the peace proposal:
As of your request for peace while you remain infidel, it is unattainable. It is a sign of your
mental weakness and lack of intellect. How stupid and ignorant you are! Do you want peace and
fraternity without having adhered to the true religion? The book of God forbids this; therefore I
cannot satisfy your request. If you want peace, say from the bottom of your heart: “I testify that
there is no God but Allah and that Muhammad is his Messenger.” For if not, we shall kill you,
destroy your houses, make your children orphans—with God’s permission—[and] we shall take
your goods as booty. . . .95
This Manichean representation of Sudanese–Ethiopian relations evokes the kind of
jihadist ideology we have described earlier. The Christian kingdom must imperatively
choose between da¯r al-Isla¯m and da¯r al-h
.
arb. Unlike the khalifa, Abu –Anja explicitly
asserts the nonexistence of any alternative deriving from the utruku¯ al-H
.
abasha hadith.
According to al-Qaddal, this letter expresses a feeling of powerfulness created by the
success of the Gondar campaign one year before.96 The emperor’s peace proposal was
interpreted as a sign of Ethiopian weakness, a conception that was not mistaken.97
Ruling Mahdist elites reactivated the ambivalent heritage of Muslim–Aksumite con-
tacts in order to legitimize evolving policies toward their Christian neighbor. Varying
regional strategic configurations made them oscillate between the two Muslim traditional
attitudes vis-a`-vis Ethiopia.
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P R O P H E T IC V IS IO N S
Besides the rather “theoretical” instrument of symbolic reactivation, a much more “prac-





regard to Ethiopian affairs, the khalifa resorted to such visions on two occasions. The
first one (5 January 1888) occurred at a critical moment in Sudanese–Ethiopian relations:
between the second letter that he addressed to Yohannes IV (mentioned previously) and
Abu –Anja’s campaign to Gondar. Attached to a message sent to the amir, the vision
granted him prophetic permission to attack Ethiopia. The khalifa depicts the Mahdist
victory as if it had already taken place: “When prophetical authorization about the
mentioned enemies [the Ethiopians] reached us, we ordered Hamdan Abu –Anja and
the ans
.
a¯r that are with him to raid them. They attacked them in the midst of their land
and vanquished them with the help of God.”99 The vision ends with the proclamation
of the takbı¯r (“God is greatest”) against Ethiopia, a symbol of God’s all powerfulness,
which no human weapon can oppose. Abu –Anja started his campaign three days after
the diffusion of this prophetic vision. The ans
.
a¯r defeated Takla-Haymanot’s forces at





ra dates from April to May 1888 and addresses the Mahdist community
as a whole. Its main objectives are to legitimize the khalifa’s past domestic policies as
well as his future foreign policies. The manner in which it deals with the Ethiopian issue
reflects the strategic situation of Sudanese–Ethiopian relations: “The Prophet informed
me in this vision that if the enemies of God, the Ethiopians, came to attack, their
hands would be tied up to their necks and we would be victorious.”101 The khalifa was
preoccupied with possible Ethiopian reprisals in response to Abu –Anja’s attacks. He
sought to warn his subjects of such an eventuality, guaranteeing a defensive victory.
As a legitimizing device, prophetic visions had the advantage of irrefutability. Indeed,
the bulk of the ans
.
a¯r could not doubt either their validity or their divine nature lest they
undermine the khalifa’s status as successor of the Mahdi. They could even be accused of
denying the Prophet himself. Conversely, the reactivation of Muslim traditions toward
Ethiopia presented an ambivalent character that exposed it to diverging interpretations
and critiques. The process of legitimization was thus divided into two distinct parts.
Whereas the word of the Prophet was meant to justify the khalifa’s Ethiopian policy in
Mahdist eyes, Muslim traditions were reactivated in the framework of a dialogue with
the Ethiopian enemy.
C O N C L U S IO N
In the first part of this article, I examined how the Tiraz depicts Sudanese–Ethiopian
relations in powerful ideological and religious terms, using them as a “panegyriza-
tion” instrument. Both the chronicle’s title and contents are devoid of any nuance or
ambiguity.
Confronting it with various primary and secondary documents achieved two major
results. First, the critical use of sources has led me to underline the Tiraz’s fundamentally
ahistorical nature. The gap between –Abd al-Qadir’s representations and a historically
(re)constructed past reveals an implicit confrontation between two discursive systems:
the persuasive ambition of a historian employed by the Mahdist regime on the one side
and, on the other, my “truth” ambition as a historian in the early 21st century. Second,
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replacing the Tiraz within a wider Mahdist perspective has prompted me to nuance
Mahdist attitudes toward Ethiopia.
Although—or perhaps because—–Abd al-Qadir was summoned to write an official
account of Sudanese–Ethiopian hostilities, his manuscript does not draw a comprehen-
sive picture of either Mahdist conceptualizations or actual policies toward Christian
Ethiopia. The Tiraz reflects selective dimensions of Mahdist positions on the Ethiopian
issue, such as the utruku¯ al-H
.
abasha hadith and the khalifa’s two letters to Yohannes IV.
However, even the mention of these items does not do justice to actual Mahdist attitudes:
the hadith is interpreted in a fashion that can only justify warfare against the Christian
empire; the letters’ significance is minimized by their random appearance in the text.
The Tiraz’s specific ideological framework masks a variety of factors underlying
the Sudanese–Ethiopian conflict, including historical, political, military, and economic
motives. Far from pretending that Mahdist leaders did not frequently resort to jihadist
discourse, I argue that it should be recognized as a rhetorical instrument of legitimization
rather than as the expression of a monolithic policy.
Focusing on representations, this study contributes to our understanding of limited
aspects of Sudanese–Ethiopian relations in the early Mahdist period. We need further
scholarly works discussing Ethiopian perspectives on the issue, examining various modes
of exchange between the two countries, or evaluating the Mahdist–Ethiopian conflict’s
later repercussions with regard to the elaboration of Sudanese and Ethiopian national
historiographies during the 20th century.
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of a local governor by Ar»aya Sellase (Yohannes IV’s son). Ahmed, Islam in Nineteenth-Century Wallo,
178.
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22Caulk, “Yohannes IV, the Mahdists,” 25; Berhanou Abebbe, Histoire de l’Ethiopie, d’Axoum a` la
Re´volution (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: Maisonneuve et Larose, 1998), 107; Henze, Histoire de l’Ethiopie,
148–49.
23Zewde, A History of Modern Ethiopia, 54; Harold G. Marcus, The Life and Times of Menelik II: Ethiopia
1844–1913 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 79, 82.
24Zewde, A History of Modern Ethiopia, 56.
25Sir E. Hertslet, The Map of Africa by Treaty, 3 vols. (London: F. Cass, 1967), 2:422–23 quoted by
Marcus, The Life and Times, 81; Abebbe, Histoire de l’Ethiopie, 114–15. For the treaty’s background, see
the detailed analysis of Zewde Gabre-Sellassie, Yohannes IV of Ethiopia: A Political Biography (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1975), 122–51.
26Francis R. Wingate, Mahdiism and the Egyptian Sudan: Being an Account of the Rise and Progress of
Mahdiism, and of Subsequent Events in the Sudan to the Present Time, 2nd ed. (London: F. Cass, 1968), 465.
27Al-Qallabat appears as Matamma in Figure 1. Although both names are sometimes used interchangeably
to designate the border town, al-Qaddal points out that they were two distinct but adjacent towns. See al-Qaddal,
Al-Mahdiyya wa-l-Habasha, 14. Al-Qadarif was also known as Suq Abu Sin.
28See n. 1.
29A man called Adam Muhammad claimed to be the prophet Jesus and managed to gather many disciples
among resentful Mahdist soldiers posted at al-Qallabat. Abu –Anja reported the event to the khalifa, who had
the conspirators executed (December 1887). Al-Dikaym’s position remains unclear, but he certainly did not
succeed in quelling the revolt. See Wingate, Mahdiism, 334–35; Na–um Shuqayr, Ta»rikh al-Sudan al-Qadim
wa-l-Hadith wa-Jughrafiyatuhu (The History of Ancient and Modern Sudan and Its Geography), 3 vols.
(Cairo: n.p., 1903), Muhammad Ibrahim Abu Salim, ed., Ta»rikh al-Sudan (The History of Sudan) (Beirut:
Dar al-Jil, 1981), 733–35; Peter M. Holt, The Mahdist State in the Sudan 1881–1898: A Study of its Origins
Development and Overthrow (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958), 152–53.
30Takla-Haymanot is the new name that ras –Adal received when he was accorded the title of negus and
given control of Gojjam and Kaffa in 1881.
31Abu Salim and al-Qaddal, Al-Harb al-Habashiyya, 15–16; al-Qaddal, Al-Mahdiyya wa-l-Habasha,
109–10.
32Holt, The Mahdist State, 155; Sanderson, “Conflict and Co-operation,” 25.
33See National Records Office (NRO), MAHDIA 1/34/10B, Balanbras Bozna Venis Balezla Governor of
Jelga to En Nur Salaa, early Jumada al-Ula 1312/November 1894; idem, Betwadded Mangasha to the Khalifa
of the Mahdi, 6 Safar 1314/17 July 1896; NRO, MAHDIA 1/34/16, Statement of Mohammed Osman El Haj
Khaled, n.d.; Sanderson, “Conflict and Co-operation,” 26, 28–37.
34Caulk, “Yohannes IV, the Mahdists,” 26; Erlich, Ethiopia, 71.
35Erlich, Ethiopia, 71; Caulk, “Yohannes IV, the Mahdists,” 27; Haim Shaked, The Life of the Sudanese
Mahdi: A Historical Study of Kitab Sa–adat al-Mustahdi bi-Sirat al-Imam al-Mahdi, the Book of the Bliss of
Him Who Seeks Guidance by the Life of the Imam the Mahdi (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1978),
8; David Robinson, “The Sudan: The Mahdi and Khalifa amid Competing Imperialisms,” in idem, Muslim
Societies in African History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 177; Abu Salim and al-Qaddal,
Al-Harb al-Habashiyya, 17. The Italians later defeated the Mahdists at Agordat (1893) and occupied Kassala
(July 1894).
36The book was completed on 6 November 1888. For a critical edition in Arabic, see Muhammad Ibrahim
Abu Salim, ed., Sa–adat al-Mustahdi bi-Sirat al-Imam al-Mahdi (Khartoum, Sudan: al-Dar al-Sudaniyya
li-l-Kutub; Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 1972). For an English summary and annotated translation, see Shaked, The
Life.
37The chronicle was finished on 6 June 1889 according to Abu Salim and al-Qaddal, Al-Harb al-
Habashiyya, 22. See also Sanderson, “Conflict and Co-operation,” 39, n. 4.
38He may have been influenced by Mahdist partisans living in El Obeid but also may have joined the
Mahdi out of sincere faith in his mission. Abu Salim nevertheless argues that he acted on pragmatic rather
than religious or ideological motives. See Sa–adat al-Mustahdi, 17–18; Abu Salim and al-Qaddal, Al-Harb
al-Habashiyya, 20.
39Historians suggest various explanations for –Abd al-Qadir’s banishment. Jealous of his sociopolitical
elevation, the qadi al-Islam Ahmad –Ali had him slandered in front of the khalifa: Husayn Sayyid Ahmad
al-Mufti, Tatawwur Nizam al-Qada» fi al-Sudan (The Development of the Judicial System in the Sudan)
(Khartoum, Sudan: n.p., 1959), 140–41. One of –Abd al-Qadir’s descendants claims that the khalifa removed
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020743809090655
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. Open University Library, on 25 Jan 2017 at 06:05:13, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
Confronting a Christian Neighbor 265
the chronicler from the center of the Mahdist state out of fear from a potential alliance with the ashra¯f: Abu
Salim, Sa–adat al-Mustahdi, 24. In a more global perspective, –Abd al-Qadir could have counted among the
victims of “the great purge which accompanied the transformation of the Mahdist theocracy into an autocracy”
between 1892 and 1896: Shaked, The Life, 30.
40Sanderson, “Conflict and Co-operation,” 28, 38–39; Shaked, The Life, 30.
41Na–um Shuqayr, who worked in the Egyptian Military Intelligence, obtained this single copy in April
1895 and gave it to his director, Francis W. Wingate. In 1958, the Tiraz was donated to the Sudan Archive of
Durham University, where it was rediscovered a decade later. See Shaked, The Life, 35.
42Abu Salim and al-Qaddal, Al-Harb al-Habashiyya, 35. Abu Salim argues that the conception of history
that prevailed in late 19th-century Sudan implied the extensive use of oral accounts at the expense of written
documents: Abu Salim, Al-Haraka al-Fikriyya fi al-Mahdiyya (The Intellectual Movement in the Mahdiyya),
3rd ed. (Khartoum, Sudan: Dar Jami–at al-Khartum li-l-Nashr, 1989), 214.
43Abu Jummayza initiated a massive opposition movement to the Mahdist regime in western Darfur (1888–
89). Thought to possess magical powers, he claimed the vacant position of Khalifa –Uthman, which the Mahdi
had previously offered to Muhammad al-Mahdi bin al-Sanusi. He died a few months after his manifestation
and was succeeded by his brother Sagha, who was killed by a victorious Mahdist army (February 1889). See
Holt, The Mahdist State, 136–40; Lidwien Kapteijns, Mahdist Faith and Sudanic Tradition: The History of
the Masalit Sultanate 1870–1930 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985), 83–94.
44Abu Salim and al-Qaddal, Al-Harb al-Habashiyya, 25–26.
45See n. 29.
46Such as the correspondence between amir Abu –Anja and negus Takla-Haymanot during the first half
of 1888. See, for instance, NRO, MAHDIA 1/34/16A/38, Hamdan Abu –Anja to negus Takla-Haymanot, 15
Jumada al-Akhira 1305/27 February 1888; NRO, MAHDIA 1/34/10B/163 negus Takla-Haymanot to Hamdan
Abu –Anja, 30 Sha–ban 1305/12 May 1888.
47Such as the episode of al-Nabi –Isa and the ashra¯f opposition. Their mention could indeed call into
question the validity of the khalifa’s position. The khalifa’s authority is reinforced by the fact that in the Tiraz
he is the only protagonist who corresponds with the Ethiopian enemy. Letters sent by other Mahdist leaders
are totally excluded.
48In the Tiraz, Yohannes IV embodies the leader of the Ethiopian unbelievers and is accused of having
attacked da¯r al-Isla¯m. –Abd al-Qadir does not mention his peace proposal to the khalifa (25 December 1888)
in order not to erode the emperor’s image as an aggressor.
49Abu Salim, Al-Haraka al-Fikriyya, 209.




51Al-Qaddal quoted by Warburg, Islam, Sectarianism, and Politics, 32. Although the term Turk was
initially used by 19th-century Sudanese to refer to their Turco-Egyptian rulers, it came to encompass all
non-Sudanese political and military elites in Sudan. The Anglo-Egyptian administration established in 1899
was thus called the “second Turkiyya” in opposition to the “first Turkiyya” dating from the 1820–85 period.
52H
.
abasha historically refers to the country’s inhabitants rather than to a territory. Derived from this
Arabic root, the term Abyssinia was attributed a territorial meaning in its European uses.
53Abu Salim and al-Qaddal, Al-Harb al-Habashiyya, 56. –Abd al-Qadir probably evokes the beginning of
Turco-Egyptian rule in the Sudan, during which the town of al-Qallabat was subordinated to Ethiopia (until
1838). See al-Qaddal, Al-Mahdiyya wa-l-Habasha, 15.
54Abu Salim and al-Qaddal, Al-Harb al-Habashiyya, 58–59. It is here referring to the battle in which
Arbab was killed by the Ethiopians (al-Qallabat, January 1887). The exaggerated number of 20,000 Mahdist
victims, which is mentioned in an Egyptian Military Intelligence report, should undoubtedly be reduced to
a few thousand. See NRO, CAIRINT 1/29/148, “War between Derviches and Abyssinians,” and al-Qaddal,
Al-Mahdiyya wa-l-Habasha, 55.
55–Abd al-Qadir quotes a Qur»anic verse to strengthen the link between Mahdist military strategy and
divine will: “God surely likes those who fight for his cause in ranks, as if they were a solid construction”
(61:4). See Abu Salim and al-Qaddal, Al-Harb al-Habashiyya, 82.
56Ibid., 98–99.
57Ibid.
58For instance, Mahdist fighters are reported to have seen the khalifa leading their army to battle, although
he was actually in Omdurman at the time. Some of them witnessed men with white flags coming down from
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the sky to help them fight the infidels. Ten months before the battle, the khalifa had a prophetic vision in
which the Prophet informed him of a coming Mahdist victory against the Ethiopians. On the battlefield, fire
burns miraculously “devoured the body of killed enemies.” Ibid., 109, 110, 111, n. 1.
59Ibid., 103.
60The matab is a cordon that Christian Ethiopians wore around their necks to mark their religious affiliation.
See Viviane A. Yagi, Le Tiraz: Chronique sur la Guerre Soudano-Abyssine de 1885–1889 (Omdurman, Sudan:
n.p., 1984); unpublished French translation of Isma–il –Abd al-Qadir al-Kurdufani, Al-Tiraz al-Manqush bi-
Bushra Qatl Yuhanna Malik al-Hubush (Omdurman, Sudan: handwritten manuscript by the ka¯tib Muhammad
Ahmad Hashim 1889), 198, n. 96.
61The title of –Abd al-Qadir’s book is in this regard very evocative. Using the term tiraz refers to a caliphal
prerogative because the embroideries and robes called by this name from the Umayyad until the Fatimid period
symbolized the khalifa’s power. See Yedida K. Stillman and Paula Sanders, “Tiraz,” in Encyclope´die de l’Islam
(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2002), 573–78. Rather than being inscribed with Khalifa –Abdullahi’s name—traditional
tiraz bore the khalifa’s name—–Abd al-Qadir’s Tiraz is decorated with the name of the vanquished enemy.
Yohannes IV’s defeat is thus transformed into an attribute of the khalifa.
62The expression “Mahdist attitudes” here refers to the stance of Mahdist political and military elites
rather than to the attitudes of Sudanese society as a whole.
63For the former, see Ahmad Ibrahim Abu Shouk, “Ideology versus Pragmatism—The Case of the Mahdist
Public Treasury in the Sudan (1881–1898),” Die Welt des Islams 46 (2006): 152; Ahmed Uthman Ibrahim,
“Some Aspects of the Ideology of the Mahdiya,” Sudan Notes and Records 60 (1979): 32. For the latter, an
Italian prisoner of the Mahdists wrote that in 1884, the Mahdi claimed he would take Khartoum, conquer
Egypt, overthrow the Ottoman sultan, and then defeat Europe: Giuseppe Cuzzi, Fifteen Years Prisoner of
the False Prophet (Khartoum, Sudan: Sudanese Heritage Series no. 3, Sudan Research Unit, 1968), 103.
Sanderson emphasizes that the Mahdi’s divine mission aimed at converting the whole world: “Conflict and
Co-operation,” 15.
64These places appear in a proclamation decreed by the Mahdi after the fall of El Obeid (January 1883):
The Apostle of God . . . said to me, “As thou didst pray in El Obeid, thou shalt pray in Khartoum, then . . . in the mosque of
Berber, then . . . in the Holy House of God, then . . . in the mosque of Yathrib, then . . . in the mosque of Cairo, then . . . in the
mosque of Jerusalem, then . . . in the mosque of al-–Iraq, then you shalt pray in the mosque of al-Kufa.”
Letter-Book of al-Nujumi, 1st unnumbered folio, quoted by Peter M. Holt, “The Sudanese Mahdia and the
Outside World,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 21 (1958): 278. This observation
contradicts Cuzzi’s account, the reliability of which can be legitimately called into question, because it was
published in a context of harshly anti-Mahdist British propaganda.
65Muslim territories comprised West and North Africa, Egypt, the Ottoman Empire, and the Arabian
peninsula. Most of the letters sent to leaders of these areas produced no results, although Mahdist beliefs were
popular in the territories of the Sokoto Caliphate (1804–1903) and the ancient empire of Bornu (1396–1893).
See Warburg, Islam, Sectarianism and Politics, 46; Holt, “The Sudanese Mahdia,” 283–88.
66For the former, see Sanderson, “Conflict and Co-operation,” 15; Viviane A. Yagi, Khalifa Abdullahi:
Sa Vie et Sa Politique (PhD diss., Montpellier III, University of Lille, France, 1990), 505; Abu Salim and
al-Qaddal, Al-Harb al-Habashiyya, 9. For the latter, see Cuzzi, Fifteen Years, 104, and Holt, “The Sudanese
Mahdia,” 289.
67Yagi applies this last conception to Sudanese–Ethiopian and Sudanese–British hostilities: Yagi, Khalifa
Abdullahi, 507. Jihad’s defensive function is related to riba¯t
.
, which implies the defense of da¯r al-Isla¯m by
forces located in ports and border towns (thughu¯r). See Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam
(Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1955), 81.
68Abu Shouk, “Ideology versus Pragmatism,” 158–59.
69Al-Qaddal, Al-Mahdiyya wa-l-Habasha, 40; Warburg, Islam, Sectarianism and Politics, 32–33.
70Holt and Daly, A History of the Sudan, 89; Caulk, “Yohannes IV, the Mahdists,” 28; Warburg, Islam,
Sectarianism and Politics, 47.
71Merid Wolde Aregay and Sergew Hable Selassie, “Sudanese–Ethiopian Relations before the Nineteenth
Century,” in Sudan in Africa, ed. Yusuf Fadl Hasan, 2nd ed. (Khartoum, Sudan: Khartoum University Press,
2006), 64–65; Mordechai Abir, “The Origins of the Ethiopian–Egyptian Border Problem in the Nineteenth
Century,” Journal of African History 8 (1967): 443, 448, 450, 459.
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72Holt, “The Sudanese Mahdia,” 287; Erlich, Ethiopia, 63, 66; Abu Salim and al-Qaddal, Al-Harb al-
Habashiyya, 10, 12; Sanderson, “Conflict and Co-operation,” 17.
73Holt and Daly, A History of the Sudan, 89; Abu Salim and al-Qaddal, Al-Harb al-Habashiyya, 12–13.
74Although the Aksumite ruler’s name is Adriaz in Ethiopian and European writings, it varies in Islamic
sources: Ashama, Askhama, Mashama, Sahma, Ashaba. He was usually known as al-naja¯shı¯, a term borrowed
from the Geez na¨gaˆsıˆ that designates the ruler. European languages transformed it into negus. See –Abdallah
El Tayeb, “On the Abyssinian Hijrah,” Sudan Notes and Records, no. 2 (1998): 160; Emeri Van Donzel,
“Al-Nadjashi,” in Encyclope´die de l’Islam (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1993), 863.
75Historians diverge on the exact Qur»anic verses that he quoted in front of Adriaz, but sura 19 (Maryam)




78For more details, see Khadduri, War and Peace, 252–67.
79Ibid., 252.
80Ibid., 256; Van Donzel, “Al-Nadjashi,” 865.
81Khadduri, War and Peace, 255–56; Erlich, Ethiopia, 9.
82Ibn Ishaq quoted by Van Donzel, “Al-Nadjashi,” 864.
83The Solomonic dynasty was established in 1270 on the Ethiopian highlands (Shoa) and claimed direct
lineage from the Aksumite kings, who themselves claimed direct descent from King Solomon and the Queen
of Sheba.
84Trimingham, Islam in Ethiopia, 85.
85See Trimingham, Islam in Ethiopia, 86, n. 2.





88MAHDIA Y80, 1. MSS Letter-Book of Uthman Diqna, SOAS 101491 khalifa to –Uthman Diqna,
Muharram 1303/October 1885, and khalifa to –Uthman Diqna, 21 Muharram 1303/31 October 1885 quoted
by Erlich, Ras Alula, 65.
89Abu Salim and al-Qaddal, Al-Harb al-Habashiyya, 71.
90Ibid., 70; Shuqayr, Ta»rikh al-Sudan, 730.
91Although the Mahdist armies did not launch any major attack against Ethiopia until January 1888,
frequent bidirectional raids had taken place in the border zone since the end of 1885. See al-Qaddal, Al-
Mahdiyya wa-l-Habasha, 55–59.
92Shuqayr, Ta»rikh al-Sudan, 736.
93Wingate, Mahdiism, 370; Muhammad Sa–id al-Qaddal, Ta»rikh al-Sudan al-Hadith: 1820–1955 (History
of the Modern Sudan: 1820–1955) (Khartoum, Sudan: Sharikat al-–Amal li-l-Tiba–a wa-l-Nashr, 1993), 198.
94NRO, MAHDIA 1/34/1/64, Hamdan Abu –Anja to Yohannes of Ethiopia, Jumada al-Ula 1306/January
1889.
95Ibid.
96Al-Qaddal, Ta»rikh al-Sudan, 199.
97Al-Qaddal, Al-Mahdiyya wa-l-Habasha, 123. Ethiopia was indeed threatened by Italian advances from
the coastal town of Massawa and suffered from many internal power struggles.
98The Mahdi had often used prophetic visions in order to proclaim the new laws of the Mahdist state. As
the Prophet’s heir (wa¯rith) and successor (khalı¯fat rasu¯l Allah), he claimed the ability to communicate directly
with the Prophet. See Layish, “The Mahdi’s Legal Methodology,” 223.
99NRO, MAHDIA 3/12 (Daftar al-S
.
adir), 9.
100According to Ethiopian traditions, forty-four churches were devastated. The sight of Gondar in flames
brought back the specter of Ahmad Gran˜ to Ethiopian minds. See Erlich, Ethiopia, 70.
101Abu Salim and al-Qaddal, Al-Harb al-Habashiyya, 127.
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